THE SHADOW WORLD OF THURMAN ARNOLD by LERNER, MAX
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME 47 MARCH, 1938 NUUBER 5
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By MAX LERNER t
I. LITERARY ANTHROPOLOGIST
TiaulAN ARNOLD'S new book* has received so much acclaim that the
task of a reviewer now is no longer to recommend it for its wit and
novelty, but to probe its weakness as well as its strength, and seek to
place it in American social thought. It has been compared, with reviewers'
exuberance, to the great ones of the earth - to Machiavelli, Darwin,
Mark, Bentham, Veblen. It has also been dismissed, typically, by Mr.
Henry Hazlitt in the New York Times, as a set of bad jokes on capi-
talism or (what is evidently even worse) an apologia for the New Deal.
Clearly it is none of these things, nor even what the author himself
would have us believe - a detached and impersonal dissection of capi-
talism. It is a spirited foray into our current ways of thinking, written
with wit and acumen, and containing a social philosophy which the reader
will discover if he doesn't get too distracted by all the signs labelled
"Laboratory" with which the author has cluttered up the place.
I aih frankly sceptical when people working on the study of societies
begin arming themselves with scalpels, slide-rules and test-tubes. For
they are promising more than they can possibly fulfill. The protestations
of complete objectivity that we have been hearing from students of
society in the past quarter century take on a religious note: it is as if
they were washing themselves in the blood of the scientific lamb. That
is why I feel disturbed when I find as sensible a person as Thurman
Arnold talling in terms of the laboratory and the dissecting room, and
making them - in his reaction against "ideals" and "inspirational phil-
osophies"- his protective symbols. I suspect that Arnold assumes his
attitude of "detachment" mainly as a literary device. For he must know
that the realm of society cannot be chartered with the inhuman precision
that we apply to physics or chemistry or astronomy. It is capable at
best only of the sort of scientific humanism that is involved in clear
thinking and factual knowledge, such as Lancelot Hogben has recently
called for in his Retreat from Reason.
tEditor, THE NArio.
*The Folklore of Capitalism (1937).
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It is as a prelude to such a scientific humanism that Arnold's book
is chiefly valuable. It belongs in the category of corrosive books, which
eat away the past complacencies, without the removal of which future
constructions are impossible. It is in that sense part of a pre-revolu-
tionary era. For the significant literature in a time of social tension such
as ours falls into three categories. One is the literature of social protest.
The second is the literature of salvation, of "the way out," ranging from
the great revolutionary proposals, through ingenious devisings, to mes-
sianic or merely crotchety schemes. The third is the literature of corrosive
"detachment," whether critically contemplative or satiric. And it is of
this third category that I want to speak.
Its habitat - like that of its dry-as-dust brother, "sound" orthodox
thought - is often the university, but more often the modest quarters
of the free-lance writer. But in either case its habits are prowling and
destructive. It is given to preying on the substantial citizenry of the
intellectual world, counting everything fair game that is smug, stuffy,
traditional, obese. The writers in this category do not wholly escape the
contagion of protest or salvation, since the one is needed as an impulsion
to analysis and the second is the inescapable sequel of it. Yet their
weight is not thrown on these. Their thrust is always at the underlying
assumptions of a social order - questioning, assaying, mocking if the
mood to mock is on them, but always undercutting the accepted first
principles and tabus of their society. They are the sappers and miners
of a social order; dangerous men because they belong to the breed of
anthropologists, and anthropologists are always more dangerous when
they study their own culture than when they dose themselves with
quinine and deck themselves out in mosquito netting to study a savage
culture. If the anthropologists who study primitive tribes are the fore-
runners of missionaries and traders, those who turn to their own cul-
tures are the forerunners of revolutionists.
I have only to mention a few names and books of the past to convey
the importance of this sort of writer, whom I should call a literary
anthropologist. Think of Swift's Gulliver's Travels, of Voltaire's Dic-
tionnaire philosophique, of Montesquieu's Lettres persanes, of Nietzsche's
Jenseits von Gut und Bdse, of Sorel's Reflexions sur la violence, of
Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class. What all of them have in com-
mon is a capacity, through a heroic effort of the imagination, to stand
aside from one's own culture and examine, it with a devastating effect.
Their anthropological attitude is a literary, not a scientific device - but
it is none the less effective.
These books are epoch-making, as Arnold's is unlikely to be, because
it lacks both their clarity and their depth. But their mo6d is his mood,
as it is also the mood of such contemporary books as James Harvey
Robinson's Mind in the Making, William Bolitho's Camera Obscura,
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Karl Mannheim's Ideologie und Utopie, the Lynds' two books on Mid-
dletown, Stuart Chase's Tyranny of Words. All of them involve turning
the searchlight on the basic institutions, premises and attitudes of our
own culture. And it is with this company that Thurman Arnold belongs.
He brings into their midst a verve, an exuberance, a sharpness of intui-
tion, a histrionic capacity that give him a quality of distinctiveness even
when his ideas are not markedly different from the rest.
II. BY WAY oF SumzARY
I want to set down what I take to be the argument of Arnold's essay
in the anthropology of our contemporary attitudes. It is not dearly
articulated or logically presented, any more than is one of his speeches.
Samuel Johnson once said of Clarissa Harlow that if you read it for
the plot you will hang yourself first. Much the same may be said of
the Folklore of Capitalism. The book grows not by a sequence of syl-
logisms, but by an aggregation of examples. And yet I think that some
of the reviewers, in emphasizing its chaos, have done less than justice
to a certain structure it possesses. As I read it, it falls into four parts.
The first (chapters 1 and 2) is an introductory statement of the author's
approach; the second (chapters 3-7) discusses the prevailing academic
folklore in economics, and contrasts "polar" thinking with that of the
"fact-minded observer ;" the third, the heart of the book (chapters 9-12),
discusses in concrete terms five phases of our economic and legal folk-
lore, being principally popular opinion about corporations and the govern-
ment; the fourth (chapters 13 and 14) represents a bold attempt on the
author's part to outline his own "principles of political dynamics."
From all these one can extract a certain point of view about society.
In trying to set it down, I shall incur the risk of setting down not only
what I have read in Arnold but also what I have read into him. But
since much of the effectiveness of the book lies in its marginal sug-
gestiveness, the risk is worth taking.
Arnold considers most social thinking, along with much of social
activity, as ritualistic. Its function, that is to say, is not that of the
laboratory but that of the theater, not description but consolation. Arnold
implies -although it would be better if he said it clearly- that most
of us dare not face the Medusa-head of social reality: it would turn us
to stone. Nevertheless, there is in us somewhere a drive to make sense
of our experience, even though that experience is a welter of nonsense.
And because, along with all the irrational impulses on which our behavior
is actually based, we have this desire for making rational order out of
our chaos, we build elaborate structures of rationalization that we call
legal and economic thinking. These structures are our ideals, our folk-
lore. They are called "sound thinking." They are cast in an abstract
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form by our university professors; they find their way into current popu-
lar thinking as unanalyzed assumptions, through the ministrations of
columnists, editors, and professional oracles. What these two groups,
academic and non-academic alike, have in common is that they are the
high priests, the shamans, the ritual-makers of the tribe - the fashioners
of the tribal folklore. This folklore, or ritual, finds its way down from
the basic social organization of government and business, into the whole
set of institutions and social organizations in which we live - the family,
the church, the club, the school, so that they all take on the same sym-
bolism and the same pattern of "sound ideas."
The function of folklore is, for the individual, consolation: to be
shored against the advancing tides of reality by ideals one may cling
to; for the group as a whole it is social cohesion and a sense of unity.
But actually there is no correspondence between the ideal formulations
and the actual practices in business - no correspondence, that is, between
the folklore of capitalism and capitalism itself. Our folklore is a body
of slogans and symbols intended as a form of social therapy. They are
healing and consoling to us, because it would be intolerable to all our
impulses and traditions to allow the practices of capitalism to continue
if we understood their naked meaning. So we interpose between our-
selves and the real world certain "little pictures" (what ingenuous effec-
tiveness in that adjective!) of the world, in the form of ideas and ideals
- neat, tidy, trim, and simply not true. All of us have our varying
sets of pictures, and the difference between liberal, reactionary and radical
is the difference between the pictures that obscure their vision of reality.
But all the pictures are neat, and all of them posit a "thinking man"
who is far less irrational than men actually are, and who will somehow
make a deliberate choice between systems of social organization.
Having come to reality with our pictures, we come away again with
them and nothing else. We have not seen anything because we have
rejected everything in the real world that did not conform to our pic-
tures. The result is that we see the economic system, which actually
operates as a far-flung army of industrial organization, penetrating and
occupying every nook of our lives, as an assemblage of hucksters in the
market-place of an economy of petty trade. We see the huge corpora-
tions, which dominate our lives, as persons whose privileged position
must be protected by the courts against government and labor, much as
might the civil liberties of an individual. Where the landscape is filled
with looming monopolies, growing out of the compulsives of the new
technology, we talk of enforcing the anti-trust laws, and we content
ourselves with such talk because it will not interfere with the onward
thrust of the monopolies. When the government seeks to recognize
the compulsives of technology, and supply the people with light, with
power, with housing, with credit, we cry out that this is tyranny. The
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reason is that we associate the government with the symbol of taxation,
and what we pay as consumers for its services seems to us in the nature
of forced contributions. But when the corporations extract the same
levies from us - or even more - in the form of inflated prices for their
products, we do not think of it as taxation; we think of ourselves as
protected by an automatic price mechanism even where it does not exist.
And when the inefficiency and depredations of the big corporation have
gone too far, and it breaks down under its own weight, our folklore
helps it rebuild itself. We construct a ritual of corporate reorganization,
highly stylized like a Chinese play - a mysterious texture of law and
economics, which is used as a screen behind which debts are written
off, shrewd horse-trading goes on, and all sorts of financial juggling is
accomplished. And when this vicarious atonement for past sins has been
complied with, the corporation is ready to proceed with further depre-
dations- that is, with business as usual.
Thus does the shadow-world of symbols mediate between our linger-
mng illusions and the advancing world of reality. Arnold sees the whole
process of government and society as a dramatic spectacle with a religious
theme - a miracle play with devils, angels, and gods. He has a healthy
contempt for our professional spokesmen -radicals, liberals and con-
servatives alike. But especially for liberals: for he sees them as obsessed
with their abstract ideals, so sunk in the ceremonial of logical consistency
that they would rather lose out in the struggle for power than deviate
in the slightest degree from the proper ceremonial. They are like the
king of France whom Veblen describes in the second chapter of The
Theory of the Leisure Class, who was burned to death because the
proper functionary was lacking to move him from the fire. But, Arnold
concludes, there is an art of political dynamics which deals with organ-
ization while it takes account of ceremonial. Its prime purpose is not
the construction of logical systems but the building of effective social
organizations. And for that task one must have not the weaver of
eternal verities but the skilled and slightly cynical compromiser.
III. THE HEAV-EI OF REALism
Arnold has put his own personal stamp on his book. He has written
it with such vividness that no one who writes either of capitalism or of
symbolism from now on will write the same for the fact that this book
has been written. In an age of timidity, he dares to be himself. His
flashes of wit and paradox are being worn thin as they pass current in
dinner-table conversation among the intellectual elite. When that happens
to a book, its real meaning is likely to be narrowed down to a particular
angle of refraction that has caught the popular eye. This chances to be
the joyousness with which Arnold deflates the current gas-bags, and
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the abandon with which he lays about with his cudgel thwackingly and
resoundingly.
Yet no man spins a book purely out of his own innards. If this one
is important, it is because it comes out of the main streams of American
thought today. And, as with most books that achieve popularity, its
deeper appeal lies not in its originality but in the sharpness with which
it says what others have been trying to say for some time, and what
they have therefore prepared us to listen to. A popular writer is one
who passes with flair and resplendence along a way already beaten out
for him, while an original writer must too often prepare the road along
which he will eventually be met.
Arnold stands at the crossing of four strains in our thought, all of
them characteristically American: first, "common-sense" realism; second,
psychologism as applied to political man, with its overtones of anti-
rationalism and anti-intellectualism; third, institutionalism in economics
and social theory; fourth, middle-class radicalism in program and tactics.
I want to consider each of these in the sections that follow.
It is the realist's boast and fond dream that he is, in William James's
phrase, tough-minded rather than tender-minded. There are few con-
temporaries that exceed Arnold in striving for toughness. And this
takes most characteristically the form of an anti-conceptualism. I have
said elsewhere1 that he observes our social attitudes with the detachment
and lively curiosity of an ethnologist watching a ceremonial dance among
the Hopi Indians. This is undoubtedly the effect he intends. But on
reflection I want to qualify the comparison. For Arnold has more at
stake in his observations than the ethnologist has. There is an animus
with which he starts- an animus against all intellectual constructs and
a contempt for the virtues of logical consistency, an animus which does
much to give his writing its quality of irony and irreverence. He is
always - in his first book' as well as the present one - concerned with
the illogic of logical thinking, the unreality of abstract principles, the
futility of intellectual system-building.
As I understand it, this is one of the oldest and newest themes in the
history of thought. For all the fervor with which Arnold clothes his
assaults, there have been Prometheans before who have raged against
the vested interests of the reigning intellectual divinities. He has chosen
to tackle one of the most persistent problems in the realm of thinking
- the problem of illusion and reality, of certitude in our minds and
change in the world outside of them, of intellectual structures and func-
tioning social organizations, of hierarchies of moral values and the twist-
ing elusive thing that we call social fact - in short, of the reality of
1. Capitalism as Magic, 146 NATION 46, 7 (Jan. 8, 1938).
2. THE SYMBOLS OF GOVEMMENT (1937).
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the world and our apprehension of it. I suspect that Arnold will not
enjoy my saying that the question he is absorbed with was once the
deep concern of the mediaeval Schoolmen. It furnished the core of the
struggle between the Realists and the Nominalists, and was the essence
of the "battle of the universals." For the mediaevals too were concerned
with the question whether the concepts that we use for the generalizations
in our thinking are only convenient and fictitious labels, or whether they
have a real existence apart from the particulars in which they appear.
I need scarcely add that the Nominalists in the Middle Ages took the
position that Arnold and the realists take today, and that this position
distressed Church and State no end. For it robbed both of them of their
most secure claim to allegiance - their claim to a continuous and uni-
versal existence. It reduced Church and State to mere bundles of human
beings, building institutions useful for the purposes of the day, but
giving way to other institutions when their utility was ended. And the
authoritarians of the day sought to demolish this heresy, much as the
Hutchinses and Adlers at Chicago today- Realists in the mediaeval
sense - regard the heresies of Thurman Arnold as dangerous. a
I have gone to some length to point this out because I believe in the
continuity of western culture, and I feel it is a mistake to truncate our-
selves too sharply from our past. We shall never escape the lot of
dealing with age-old problems, and our only hope is to deal with them
in a fresh way. But I fear that many of Arnold's successes in demolish-
ing concepts are set-ups, achieved by premising the hollowness of all
concepts. We make a drastic error if, in fighting certain over-artificial
intellectual constructs, we forget that we can fight them only with other
intellectual constructs, not with bare knuckles and mother wit.
Arnold has done an exhilarating job in knocking the stuffing out of
all sorts of saw-dust laden minds. For that, all honor to him. But he
is doing us a disservice by his fierce atomism - by implying, as his book
seems to, that all rational and conceptual thinking necessarily consists
of sawdust, or even that its main effect is to hamper social constructions.
For he must know what immense new constructions of the western A.orld
stem directly from the rational systems of the English seventeenth cen-
tury political theorists and the French eighteenth century philosophes.
He must know that the new social organizations of the fascist states -
whatever we may think of them- derive largely from the writings of
Nietzsche, Bergson, Spengler, Sorel and Houston Stewart Chamberlain,
and that Hitler's foreign policy, step by step, may be found charted out
in the pages of Mein Kampf. He must know that the social construc-
3. John Chamberlain reports that Hutchins remarked to him: "Yes, Thurman
Arnold is unique. So is a rattlesnake unique." I fear that in both eases he was doing
an injustice to his own Realist mediaeval doctrine. See Chamberlain, The Folhiore of
Reizewers, SATURDAY REv. OF LIT., March 12, 1938.
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tions of the future cannot help owing a great deal to the logical system-
building of Marx and Engels. Actually Arnold disproves his own thesis.
For after a scathing attack on "abstract ideals" and logical systems, he
devotes his last two chapters to "the social philosophy of tomorrow,"
and "some principles of political dynamics." Clearly the other fellow's
"abstract ideals" become one's own "principles of political dynamics."
And thus the intellectual constructs that have been thrown out of the
window come back by the kitchen door.
Along with a fierce atomism, there is in Arnold a fierce pragmatism.
He wants to know what things work or fail to work in society, why
certain programs succeed while others fail, what stands in the way be-
tween social thinking and social effectiveness, what are the rules of
action for the men and groups who win out in the fierce struggle for a
place in the sun. He is not content with thrashing over the dry straw
of other men's intellectual disputes. His concern is with what works as
against what is only logically consistent- a concern possible only in an
age in which the rational technology of industry has yielded place to the
manipulations of corporate finance, the propaganda machines of nations
in mortal combat, the power-diplomacy of fascist adventurers. And I
suspect that in this contempt for the geometry of reason and in his fervor
for the instrumentalisms of the contemporary world, Arnold is not merely
expressing some personal experience of disillusionment. He sums up
tragically the consciousness of a generation which thinks that the social
good which it has failed to achieve by rational effort can be won by
being fragmentized and pursued with a desperate immediacy.
I think I can understand Arnold and sympathize with his animus,
because I belong to the same desperate generation. Nevertheless I can-
not find any comfort in a heaven of realism from which, because con-
cepts have grown old and stuffy or been captured by the enemy, we
would eject all concepts- even those that are necessary to defeat the
enemy or give meaning to life. I know that Arnold will say at this
point that the terms "enemy," "meaning," betray me, for they are in
his terminology "polar words" and as such have no place in the vocabu-
lary of "the fact-minded observer." But one of the revealing things
about his book is this very insistence not only on distinguishing between
observation and value-judgments, but on excluding all values from his
system. What would be left if he succeeded in doing this- which, of
course, he does not- would be a chaos of atomistic "facts," unrelated
and meaningless, powerless even to cluster themselves into those "prin-
ciples of political dynamics" upon which Arnold is finally thrust back.
Like Satan who carried Hell with him wherever he went, Arnold can-
not escape the abstraction. The "fact-minded observer" is himself an
"abstract ideal," a "polar word," a fictitious refuge from Arnold's own
passionate fear of values. So also is his other favorite, the "organizing
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man." By the realism which refuses to face the need for abstractions,
Arnold succeeds only in admitting them by inadvertence and thus becomes
the more readily their victim.
My guess is that Arnold's fierceness against concepts comes chiefly
from his training in law. It is in law that concepts, long after their
vitality is gone, linger on as fictions and rituals. And it has become the
tradition of the school of legal realists to aim their sharpest javelin
thrusts against the rituals and formalizations of the law. The realist
believes that there is something more "real" than these rituals, and he
goes off in pursuit of that something. The interesting thing about
Arnold, on the contrary, is that he finds the real meaning and force in
the law exactly in the ritual itself. For he sees that the ritual holds a
subjective sway over men's minds, largely because of its correspondence
with their desire for the dramatic and the symbolic. I think it may be
-said that the school of legal realism has two divisions. Both start with
the discrepancies between our pictures of the law ("the law in books,"
etc.) and the law as it is ("the law in action"). But one branches off
to concentrate on examining the latter, while the second, including
Arnold - through the fascination that symbols hold for him - is mainly
interested in the former.
Let us follow him into his world of symbols and myths. For if there
is anything to bolster his uncompromising realism, we must seek it in
the picture he draws of psychological chaos in human beings.
IV. THE DANCE OF THE SYMBOLS
I have dealt in the last section with the over-rationality (in Arnold's
scheme) of legal ritual and other symbolic constructs. I want to deal
now with the under-rationality, or irrationality, of the minds on which
those symbols impinge. Arnold has been deeply affected by the psycholo-
gism of modem thought. He learned much from contact with the restless
and pioneering mind of Edward S. Robinson, with whom he collaborated
in a seminar on law and psychology. But his handling of the psycho-
logical schools is still that of the brilliant amateur. One finds in the
present book a measure of behaviorism, a dash of Gestaltism, a bowing
acquaintance with the experimental techniques, a large admixture of
psychoanalysis and psychiatry of various brands, and a liberal dose of
the social psychology of crowds. The result is a generous eclecticism
which, while it may bewilder or even appall the reader, produces at least
an intense intellectual ferment.
What these various psychologies finally boil down to as a residue is
the complete and utter irrationalism of man as a political animal. Just
as he has a dislike for concepts, so Arnold has a distrust of reason. The
"reasonable man" or the "thinking man" is one of his dearest objects
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of ridicule. Through the entire book Arnold parades man as exactly the
opposite - incapable of grasping more than the stereotypes of politics,
hungry for drama and display, ridden by myths which he is incapable
of examining in any critical fashion, narcissist in his desire to dress
himself up in various roles and parade through his own imagination,
incapable of creating except through great leaders and organizers, herd-
like in following the leader's aim and the mass emotion. I do not believe
I have overdrawn the picture, which I have had to piece together from
various parts of the book.
Clearly such a psychological conception is a sharp instrument for
puncturing many pretensions, effective in probing for obscure motiva-
tions and for uncovering hidden ideologies. Arnold sees politics, in a
sense, as a histrionic release from the intolerable burden of having to
live and think like rational creatures on the basis of an irrational psychic
endowment. It is this fault-line between the pretensions of rationality
and the facts of irrationality that does much to give the book what
elements it possesses of high farce. For in the most serious sense, such
a confronting of discrepancies is an exploration of the comic. What
a Teutonic scholar like Mannheim 4 does in a lumbering way to uncover
and lay bare the thrusts of impulse and interest behind the formal edifices
of reasoning, Arnold accomplishes with wit and esprit, if with a good
deal less of method. What the Marxians do to economic interests on
the assumption that man is a rational animal, Arnold does to the Marxians
and other system-builders on the assumption that man is quite irrational.
And as for the unveiling of the hypocrisies, the blind aimlessness, the
feckless shams of business practises, no one since Veblen has done it
with as savage a gusto or as devastating an effect.
But granted these rich values, Arnold's method and conception have
their grave limitations. The first lies in the use of the symbolic instru-
ment itself. Arnold fails to differentiate between the levels of symbolism.
There are symbols that are merely abbreviations, without which life
would grow too complex for survival. There are also symbols that are
short-cuts to emotion, ways of revealing or obscuring the meaning of
society. There are symbols by which some men achieve and maintain a
hold over the rest of mankind. There are finally, as Arnold might have
learned from Whitehead,5 whole symbol-clusters that are evocative ways
of thought and patterns of life. Man as we find him is irrational enough;
but Arnold adds to this irrationality by attributing the distorting effects
of symbolism even to the situations where symbols alone give life mean-
ing and where they clear the path for, instead of blocking, social con-
struction. He lumps all the symbolisms of men's actions together, with-
4. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1936).
5. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM: ITS MEANING AND ErraCr, 196.
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out getting at the purposes of those actions, without getting at the for
wizats? An irrational symbol for one purpose may be a perfectly rational
symbol for another. It is Arnold's incapacity to say for what? to his
symbols that is at the root of much of the book's confusion. When you
see everything as undifferentiated symbols, then the symbol ceases to
have meaning, but takes its place only as a senseless particle in a mad
dance.
The second difficulty however lies in the anti-intellectualism and anti-
rationalism toward which Arnold's position inclines him. I say "inclines"
because Arnold may well answer that he is not necessarily anti-anything,
whether rationalism or irrationalism - that he is merely describing men
as irrational. That is strictly true. Yet with only a limited number of
conceptions of man's rationality available, the one you choose for describ-
ing the world is also the one you use for evaluating it. And Arnold is
throughout the book betraying his scheme of valuation. He depicts
thinkers as stumbling along ineffectually while the decisions of the world
are left to men of little logic and ruthless purpose. The intellectual, in
the book, is always flouted in favor of the hard-boiled practical politician
and the organizing genius. Arnold displays a faith in the latter almost
akin to the sentiment the eighteenth century felt for the Noble Savage.
And as a corollary to the esteem he feels for the big doers, arid the
leaning toward the great-man conception of the historic process, there
is a tendency toward anti-massism in the book. After expanding on the
irrational blunderings, hypocrisies, slavishnesses of most men, Arnold
singles out as the agents of social construction "men without moral il-
lusion who are able to create great organizations through the sheer use
of power." He has in mind, in this context and others, men like Hitler,
Mussolini, Stalin, Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller, John L. Lewis.
Arnold is motivated, I suspect, by a reaction against the centuries of
reason, much like his animus against abstract ideals. He is disillusioned
about them. If one understands that disillusionment, one understands
also the climate of opinion in which the luxuriant growths of recent ir-
rational philosophies have sprung up and the quest of symbols has flour-
ished. Take a generation which intellectually spans the post-War and
post-Depression period, both of them filled with hypocrisies which have
made the most significant American expressions of our time "Oh yeah?"
and "it's a racket." What such a generation tends to develop is not so
much a philosophy as a reaction against the intolerable humiliation of
having been "let down." Out of this comes the impulse toward "de-
bunking"- the inevitable sequel of a sharp disenchantment with once
cherished values. The most important influences in the thinking of this
generation have been the experience with war propaganda and the study
of the techniques that the fascist and communist movements have used
in manipulating the effective symbols for mass persuasion, both separ-
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ately and in their mutual conflict. The effect of these influences on our
political and psychological thinking can scarcely be overestimated. They
are comparable to the effect of capitalist collapse upon our economic
thinking.
Given this climate of opinion, it explains but does not validate the
anti-rationalism of Arnold. For in his reaction against the centuries of
the great hope, he fails to see the strides that men have made through
their tireless perfection of what little wit nature has given them. Despite
his exaggerated use of the symbolism of the laboratory in his own behalf,
Arnold is very grudging toward science. He fails to see that men have
moved forward through the rational thinking about themselves and their
world which is science, technology, social science. While science may be
a symbol, it is also an objective fact in human history. And unless men
can learn how to use this symbol, or fact, for new social constructions
and for the creation of new symbolisms, they may well end up not in
the relative decency that Arnold in his final chapters forsees for them,
but in complete barbarism.
There is a curious blindness in the book with respect to the potential
value of revolutionary and reconstructive symbolism. Arnold does not
distinguish between the folklore that challenges the status quo and the
folklqre that hems in and defends it. The only emerging philosophies
that he alludes to are those of the New Deal and the nationalist dicta-
torships, but they are all lumped in their treatment with the philosophy
of present-day capitalism. Yet the revolutionary philosophies are com-
pletely different in their class base, their purposes, the resources of social
power they bring to their support.
V. INSTITUTIONS AND LAG
There can be no analysis of folklore without an analysis of the social
structures from which it grows, no theory of capitalism without a.theory
of institutions. In his discussion of capitalism, Arnold follows in general
the lead of the institutional economists. Among them he seems to have
been most deeply influenced by Thorstein Veblen, Walton Hamilton,
and A. A. Berle and Gardiner Means. It is not surprising that he should
cultivate their company, for the essence of institutional economics is
revolt against the too austere and abstract formulations of the classical
Old Masters. And in its revolt, it succeeds also in breaking down econ-
omics itself as a category so that it becomes merely the most significant
point at which law, custom, technology, psychology, and property rela-
tions meet and cross.
In such an economics, Thurman Arnold is clearly as happy as a pro-
fessorial cow that has kicked down the fences and found succulent pas-
tures to roam in. It is where law meets economics, rather than where
(Vol. 47: 687
1938] THE SHADOW WORLD OF THURMAN ARNOLD 699
law meets psychology or metaphysics, that Arnold finds the best graz-
ing and the greatest felicity. His most masterly chapter is easily, and by
a quite general accord, the one on The Ritual of Corporate Reorganiza-
tion. Those on taxation and the anti-trust laws are runners-up in inter-
est. He is at his best when he is dealing with operative legal and economic
techniques, and never so effective as when the ostensible purpose of the
techniques is far removed from their actual function.
For Arnold's most fruitful thinking is based on the lag. That is one
reason among many good ones why he will never be a Marxian. For
Marxian social thought is built on the conditioning relationships between
the several parts of a hierarchy- between the material base, the class
structure, the secondary social structures, the idea systems of a society
-and on the laws of movement and change from one hierarchy to
another in time. Institutional thought, on the other hand, is built on
the distances or lags between the various elements in a social complex.
And Arnold glories in the lag. He approaches a problem at the point
where he can find the most striking discrepancy between the going tech-
nology and the pace of industrial change on the one hand, and, on the
other, the legal rituals and popular symbols through or despite which
the technology is finally translated into consumable goods. What inter-
ests him, in short, is the distance that separates economic reality from
economic and legal opinion and emotion. That distance is spanned by
the folldore of a culture.
But more than with the lag itself, Arnold is concerned with the
mechanism by which men are kept more or less unconscious of its ex-
istence, and the mechanism by which the fact of the lag facilitates a
rough adjustment to an imperfect world. Let me illustrate by Arnold's
chapter on the anti-trust laws. The economic reality is the large-scale
industrial technique, demanding large-scale methods of distribution. The
lag is the distance that separates such a technique and its demands from
the prevailing economic opinion favoring the small productive unit and
the competitive market. The mechanism of the anti-trust laws, says
Arnold, satisfies our ideal of the preservation of competition; at the
same time it also satisfies the compulsives of the industrial techniques.
It can do both by the fact of being on the statute books and being the
subject of a vigorous campaign, yet remaining essentially unenforced
because of the enormous difficulty of enforcement and the clumsiness of
the machinery. Our censor is, so to speak, lulled into unawareness of
the continued existence of the lag; and under cover of that unawareness,
business enterprise is built up to monopoly form, and a rough adjustment
is made to the compulsives of the new techniques.
Arnold's theory is neat. But it has several difficulties. One is that
there is nothing in it that indicates why the lag arises in the first place.
The second is, that it does not indicate why, having arisen, the lag is
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maintained, and why it is not resolved. The third is that when the
theorist turns actor, the theory has to be tempered.
Arnold does not explain why the lag arises, because his theory does
not carry him beyond a certain static quality in opinion which does not
allow it to keep pace with the pace of social change. Yet the fact of
the inertia of ideas is not enough, for ideas do change - often at a revo-
lutionary pace- when the conditions are right for change. What is
needed in addition is a theory of vested interests and vested ideas, which
puts a premium on conformity in thought even while it places a similar
premium upon advance in technology. And once the lag arises, it is
maintained for the same essential reason. It continues because the
machinery of political power and the control over the channels for
forming public opinion are in the hands of the group that wants monopoly
and sees that it can best achieve it by maintaining the fiction of com-
petitive units in a petty economy. In short, the changes in technology
are not translated into corresponding changes in property relations or
the relations of class power- i.e., not translated into corresponding
institutional change.
I have said thiat when the theorist finally turns actor, the theory has
to be tempered. But that will best introduce another phase of Arnold's
thought.
VI. TACTIC -FOR WHAT?
As I write, the United States Senate, through a sub-committee of its
Committee on the Judiciary, has just had a tussle with the meaning of
Professor Arnold's book and the validity of his thinking. Book and
author have thus far come out on top, but I ask myself whether it is not
a Pyrrhic victory. Arnold got the recommendation confirming his ap-
pointment, but I am half-inclined to the view that he left his theory
behind on the field of battle.
By one of those ironic twists of fate, Arnold was nominated to be
Assistant Attorney General in charge of anti-trust law enforcement, to
succeed Robert H. Jackson.' With a coolness that does justice to his
courage, he accepted the nomination, and faced Senator Borah, whom
he had in his book called (in effect) the high-priest of the folklore of
the anti-trust laws. The newspapers were quick to see an opportunity
for exploiting some of their own folklore, and making some anti-New
Deal capital, and for several days the editorial pages carried succulent
excerpts from the chapter on the anti-trust laws. Would the author of
The Folklore of Capitalism, they asked, have his heart in the job? But
the campaign died down. Arnold was obviously so well qualified for the
6. Mr. Jackson became Solicitor-General, although by not too wide a margin of
confirmation. He writes no books, but-what is almost as dangerous-he makes speeches.
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post by gifts and training that blocking his nomination would be fan-
tastic. Their own hearts were not in the job of hounding him.
I am certain that Arnold will make a first-rate man for his post. Yet
the irony of the appointment remains -except that it is an irony directed
back toward the book. One who reads the account of the Arnold-Borah
encounter in the committee room cannot but feel that the temper of
Arnold's replies to Borah was not quite the temper of the book. There
was more restraint in it, less joyousness, less certitude, less of the sharp
quality of the dissecting room. The moral, of course, is that you don't
take your dissecting instruments into the Senate chamber- it would
clutter up the place and get in the way of the Senators. Yet it is a
moral worth remembering. Here was the historian who was given a
chance not only to write history but to make it: and he failed to carry
over his historian's techniques. Here was the philosopher become king,
acting every inch the king but somewhat less the philosopher.
This raises the entire question of Arnold's "principles of political
dynamics." The tactic that Arnold builds up in his concluding chapters
is a tactic of accommodation and compromise; Arnold has been com-
pared with many great writers of the past, but in this respect the best
comparison is with John Morley's On Compromise. The heart of the
book seems to me to lie in the new tactic of capitalist progressivism that
it proposes.
There can be no doubt that a new movement of what we may call
middle-class radicalism is arising in America. To my mind, Arnold-
more than any man who has appeared on the landscape so far- is its
philosopher: he rationalizes both its thought and its tactic. The possible
exception is President Roosevelt, who is a good tactician but no phil-
osopher, and who is better counted as a datum for Arnold to rationalize.
There is a deep nativist streak in Arnold's thinking, which shows itself
in an isolationism both as to foreign policy and foreign thought. There
is something of the spaciousness and exuberance of the American plains
in him, as also in a politician who comes very close to Arnold's ideal-
Congressman Maury Maverick of Texas. Arnold writes of the "rise
of a class of engineers, salesmen, minor executives, social workers" as
the significant emergence of the immediate future. His chapter on "The
Social Philosophy of Tomorrow" is a vague but provocative forecast
of the coming of something that is neither communism nor capitalism,
but something else in its own way just as thorough going -that tertium
quid, an American radicalism. Its tactic is to be gloriously opportunistic,
something very close to a shrewd and intuitive demaogism.
This is, of course, not Arnold's own program: he is again describing
what he sees ahead, not advocating anything. Yet we have learned from
Veblen's example that description, if persistent and exclusive, may be
held faute de inieux to take the place of advocacy. Perhaps that is doing
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Arnold an injustice. But there can be little doubt that all this jibes pretty
well with the principles of political dynamics that he confesses to. It has
given rise, among certain critics,7 to the warning that there are elements
in Arnold's thinking that run parallel to elements to be found in fascism.
I think that's going it strong. But Arnold's anti-rationalism, his anti-
intellectualism, his radical pragmatism, his cult of the survivor, his
deification of the practical man and the organizing genius, his emphasis
on the discovery of effective techniques, his opportunism, his leaning
toward middle-class radicalism, his mob-psychology conception of the
masses-all these, if torn out of the context of Arnold's own pattern,
could be fitted into a pattern that would begin to look sinister. I say
this not because I feel that anyone as sophisticated about politics as
Arnold is needs any admonition. I say it because it is always worth
while for us to remind ourselves that as political thinkers, no less than
as political administrators appearing before Senate Committees or as
editors or as teachers, we owe a responsibility to our ideas. And that
responsibility is to think of them in the context of our time, and in the
light of the tendencies rampant in our world. Direction and consequence
are as much part of ideas as origin and innate quality.
Yet my guess is that the real criticism of Arnold is not in the fact
that his ideas tend to form any sort of pattern, but that there is too little
pattern in them. In his almost obsessive desire to steer clear of ideal
values and moral judgments, he has had to concentrate on tactics and
techniques exclusively. His last chapter tells you how to get things done
in politics: what you may want to get done is your own affair. Now,
I have no stomach to reprove a man for not doing what he does not
set out to do. Arnold has not chosen to write a program, or a theory
of moral or political values. Yet that is in itself a deeply significant
thing. He gives us a tactic - but for what? Means have no import with-
out ends: yet when you get to the question of ends, Arnold is madden-
ingly elusive. It is deeply significant that we find in him no real economic
philosophy or program, other than a vague allegiance to the amorphous
experimentalism of the New Deal; no political tactic that goes beyond
techniques to programs or values; no philosophy of industrial change
that goes beyond a grasp of the importance of technology and its com-
pulsive character.
VII. BEYOND MYTHS
Do what you will with Thurman Arnold, you cannot ignore him. l-e
has placed himself squarely in the path of our attention, as few social
thinkers have done in this decade; and his book is one of the best war-
rants of the vitality of our thought. There is in him a daring and
7. Cf. James Burnham, Book Review, 4 PARTISAN REVIEW, (Marc, 1938) 50-53.
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irresponsibility that go with singular creativeness. He takes intellectual
risks that the more cautious and cloistered of us would consider dizzying.
He is volatile, shifting, contradictory- but he is alive, and so is his
book. Its confusion is a mirror and index of the confusion of our social
system and our whole intellectual world; but its acid is the expression
of a corrosive force in our culture which may yet dissolve those con-
fusions and make new social constructions possible.
And yet I cannot suppress the feeling, for all of Arnold's realism,
for all his shrewd insights into men's motives and foibles, for all his
tough-minded grasp of the dynamics of political life, that the plane on
which he does his thinking is the shadow-world of tvo-dimensional
symbols, which do not reach to the substance of social reality. "Men
believe that society is disintegrating," he says in one place, "when it
can no longer be pictured in familiar terms." True enough, and a good
truth on the symbolic plane. But let us go beyond symbols, beyond
myths, beyond what men believe, to society itself as an objective fact.
When is society disintegrating? But to answer this, Arnold would have
to have not a philosophy of symbols, but a theory of society and of
history. Perhaps one answer is that society is disintegrating when its
thinkers no longer ask when it is, but only when men believe it to be.
But that is only a surmise, not a theory. The fate of societies, we may
be certain, will be decided not by symbols but by the strength of what
they stand for.
